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Abstract 
The attack and defense game is a game in which an attacker (a group of attackers) has an 
incentive to revise the status quo and a defender (a group of defenders) wants to protect it. The 
asymmetry in objectives creates incompatible interests and results in a mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibrium. However, this equilibrium could be heavily impacted by behavioral considerations. 
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The definition of conflict 
Although conflict is a subject of study in all fields of the social sciences, the definition of 
conflict is not the same across disciplines. Economists, for example, define conflict as a situation 
in which competitors choose costly inputs in pursuit of private payoffs framed as wins and losses 
(Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2007; Kimbrough et al., 2019). Evolutionary biologists, define 
conflict in terms of Darwinian fitness (Darwin, 1859), where at least one of the species 
negatively affects the others’ fitness (Rusch and Gavrilets, 2019).  
De Dreu and Gross (2019) propose a definition of conflict as a game of attack and 
defense. Indeed, many conflicts have such structure: there is an attacker who wants to revise the 
status quo and a defender who wants to protect it. Also, such a definition of conflict conceptually 
fits most disciplines, by pointing out incompatibility of interests by the parties involved in the 
conflict. 
 
Attack and defense games 
The main assumption behind the attack and defense game of De Dreu and Gross (2019) is 
that conflicting parties have asymmetric objectives. As a result of this asymmetry, the solution to 
such a game is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. 
The continuous version of the attack and defense game resembles an all-pay auction 
(contest) with externalities (Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2011; Baye et al., 2012). Also, such a 
game is closely connected to the attack and defense games of a weakest-link network of targets 
(Clark and Konrad, 2007; Kovenock and Roberson, 2018; Kovenock et al., 2019), in which the 
attacker’s objective is to assault at least one target successfully and the defender’s objective is to 
defend all targets. Finally, the attack and defense game is closely related to games of profiling 
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(Kydd, 2011; Holt et al., 2016), in which attackers choose which demographic “type” to recruit 
and defenders choose which demographic types to search. All aforementioned conflict games 
have a structure where there is an attacker and a defender, who have asymmetric objectives, and 
whose interests are incompatible. Therefore, these games are directly linked to the attack and 
defense game of De Dreu and Gross (2019). 
 
Behavioral considerations 
There are many behavioral considerations that may influence the actual behavior of 
competitors in the game of attack and defense. First, if attackers are inequity averse (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999) then conflicts could be less intense than predicted by the standard game theory. 
However, if attackers are spiteful (which is a more realistic assumption) then conflicts are more 
likely to escalate (Mago et al., 2016). Conflicts could also escalate if competitors, in addition to 
monetary utility, derive a utility from winning itself (Sheremeta, 2010), or if competitors are 
regret averse (Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay, 2007).  
Other important behavioral considerations include guilt aversion, loss aversion, 
overconfidence, impulsivity, and various emotional responses. Without proper game-theoretic 
analysis (Konrad, 2009) and experimental testing (Dechenaux et al., 2015) it is not clear how 
these behavioral factors impact individual behavior of competitors in the game of attack and 
defense. 
 
Intergroup games of attack and defense 
Many conflicts involve multiple attackers and defenders, resulting in an intergroup 
conflict game with asymmetric objectives (Chowdhury et al., 2013; Chowdhury and Topolyan, 
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2016). Scientists from different fields have been fascinated by such games not only because of 
their prevalence in real life, but also because intergroup conflicts have a number of interesting 
features with non-trivial tradeoffs. For example, attackers may have an incentive to cooperate 
with each other by expending effort in order to carry out a successful attack, but since effort is 
costly, each attacker also has an incentive to abstain from expending any effort and instead free-
ride on the efforts of others. Also, since attackers and defenders have asymmetric objectives, the 
problem of free-riding can be different for the group of attackers and the group of defenders. De 
Dreu and Gross (2019) point out that defender groups share a common fate when they lose, and 
so their individual interests are more aligned than that of attacker groups. Consequently, this 
asymmetry results in stronger incentives to free-ride among attackers than among defenders. 
Another interesting asymmetry pointed out by Dreu and Gross (2019) is that in-group 
identification could be stronger among defenders than attackers. These are interesting hypotheses 
that are worth further investigation. 
 
Mechanisms of intragroup cooperation 
The asymmetry in free-riding incentives between attackers and defenders creates a 
greater need for attackers to employ various cooperation mechanisms in solving the free-riding 
problem. Such mechanisms could involve negative reinforcement, such as shaming, sanctioning, 
punishment, and ostracism, as well as positive reinforcement, such as communication, 
leadership, and feedback. Although most of these mechanisms have been studied in the context 
of intergroup conflicts (Sheremeta, 2018), they have not been studied in the context of intergroup 
attack and defense games. This is an interesting avenue for future research. 
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